We propose a lightweight scheme for fault diagnosis in time-triggered (TT) systems. An existing scheme is preferable in its capability but incurs computation time that can be prohibitively large for some real-time systems, such as automotive control systems. Our proposed scheme, which we call voting sharing, can substantially reduce the computation time by sharing the diagnosis result obtained by each node with all nodes in the system. We clarify the properties of the voting sharing scheme with respect to fault tolerance and show some experimental results.
Introduction
Time-Triggered (TT) platforms are increasingly common for real-time, life-critical systems. In this paper we focus on automotive applications. For such applications, FlexRay has been widely adopted as a major TT platform [1] . FlexRay allows timely and reliable communication between ECUs (Electronic Control Units) or simply nodes, distributed in a vehicle. However, nodes may fail, and thus, should this happen, it would be necessary to detect the failed node and isolate it from the set of active nodes. At the same time, the decision on which nodes are faulty and should be isolated must be unanimous.
Membership is the functionality that provides a consistent view of active nodes to each node. Membership for TT architectures is well studied [2] - [4] . In fact we implemented the membership functionality in our drive-by-wire prototype using the FlexRay system [5] . A performance analysis of this prototype system showed that the computation overhead incurred by the membership functionality increased quadratically in the number of nodes. It also revealed that when the number of nodes was six, the overhead consumed more than five percent of the whole computation time available at each ECU. In practice, this overhead is prohibitively large. A further analysis showed that a significant part of the computation was consumed in voting on syndromes collected from all nodes. This implies that reducing the overhead requires reducing the computation time used for the voting process. Here, a syndrome is a vector that represents the status of nodes perceived by a single node. By performing voting on syndromes, all nodes can obtain a consistent health vector which represents the nodes' status.
To address the problem of overhead reduction, this paper proposes a method which we call voting sharing. In voting sharing, each node performs voting only on a single entity, rather than the whole vector, of syndromes. By sharing the voting result, all nodes can obtain a consistent health vector without performing the costly voting operation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of TT systems. Section 3 describes the existing approach to membership in TT architectures. Then Sect. 4 describes voting sharing and shows the properties it guarantees. Section 5 shows some experimental results on execution time. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper with possible directions of future work.
Model of Time Triggered Systems
We consider a generic TT system which encompasses FlexRay. The system consists of n nodes having unique IDs 1, 2, . . . , n. The communication network is the bus type with TDMA (time division multiple access). The system runs by consecutively executing synchronous rounds, starting from round 1. A node is assigned its own sending slots where it can send a message frame. A frame sent by a node is received by all the other nodes. All sending slots are statically scheduled in the design time and thus never overlap. Every node sends a frame at least once in one round.
Faults of nodes are observed as communication errors. A fault that a node suffers is either benign or symmetric Byzantine. If a node suffers a benign fault at round k, then the message frame sent by the node in the round is lost. Hence all nodes can locally detect it in round k. If a node suffers a symmetric Byzantine fault at round k, then, at the same round, all nodes receive from the faulty node the same erroneous message which does not conform to the protocol specification.
Nodes are correct, obedient, or symmetric Byzantine faulty. Correct nodes follow the protocol specification and suffer no faults. Obedient nodes follow the specification but they may or may not suffer benign faults. Correct nodes are thus also obedient. Symmetric Byzantine faulty nodes do not follow the specification and suffer symmetric Byzantine faults. We assume:
where s is the number of symmetric Byzantine faulty nodes, and b is the number of benign faulty nodes.
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Existing Approach to Membership

Overview
Some membership protocols for TT systems are proposed in, for example, [2] , [5] . In this paper we consider the one shown in [5] as a basis for our new approach, though these protocols are very similar. The existing approach to membership starts at every round k the sequence of three phases, which spans two consecutive rounds, namely, rounds k and k + 1, as follows. In round k, each node evaluates other nodes' status locally by receiving and evaluating frames sent by other nodes (EVA phase).
In the following round, round k + 1, the local syndrome, which represents the local view of other nodes' status evaluated in round k, is exchanged among all nodes (EXC phase). A local syndrome for node p is a binary ntuple s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n where s i = 1 if p evaluates node i as non-faulty and s i = 0 otherwise.
In the same round (i.e., round k + 1), each node determines node status by voting on the exchanged local syndromes (DET phase). Specifically, a node constructs a diagnostic matrix where the ith row is the local syndrome received from node i and the jth column is a vector representing the evaluation for node j from all nodes. An element e i, j is either 1, 0, ε or −. The case e i, j = ε, i j occurs if node i failed to send its local syndrome in round k + 1 because of its benign fault. The opinion of a node about itself, i.e., e i,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is considered unreliable and thus is assigned a special value − which specifies that it is discarded in voting.
By performing hybrid voting [6] over each of the columns, each node obtains a binary n-tuple called a health vector where the ith element represents whether node i is non-faulty or faulty. Specifically, hybrid voting is defined as follows:
where V is the column that is voted on, and N 0 (V) and N 1 (V) are the number of occurrences of 0 and 1 in V. The health vector is then updated to accuse Byzantine faulty nodes. If the current health vectorĥv and the local syndrome sent from node i respectively have 0 and 1 or 1 and 0 on the same position, then node i is identified as a faulty node. The final health vector hv is obtained fromĥv by setting the value on the ith position to 0 for all such nodes i. † Based on the health vector, a node updates counters associated with nodes and possibly eliminates faulty nodes from the active ones. For example, one can eliminate a node † We regard benign and symmetric Byzantine faulty nodes as equally serious because the potential causes of these faults are all physical [7] . This is in contrast to systems deployed in open networks, where intrusion is the main cause of Byzantine faults. by counting the number of times when the node is diagnosed as faulty and by deciding its elimination when the counter exceeds a predefined threshold. The process of updating the counters can be regarded as executing a stateful function that takes a health vector as input and produces a set of active nodes as output. We denote by updateCounter(hv) this counter updating function.
Note that multiple instances of this sequence of phases are executed concurrently as shown in Fig. 1 . The node status evaluation process (EVA) can be done concurrently in the status data exchanging phase (EXC) by evaluating the exchanged status data. Due to this pipeline-like process execution, a fault detected in a round can be identified in the next round.
As an example, consider a system consisting of n = 5 nodes where node 2 is symmetric Byzantine faulty and the other nodes are obedient. Suppose that node 1 suffers benign faults in rounds k and k +1. Also suppose that node 2 sends an erroneous local syndrome in round k + 1. Then, in round k + 1 each obedient node forms a diagnosis matrix as follows:
from node 1 from node 2 from node 3 from node 4 from node 5
Upon forming the matrix, every obedient node performs hybrid voting on each column. In hybrid voting, ε and − values are first discarded and then voting is performed on the remaining values. In this case, all obedient nodes obtain the following temporal health vector.
Then Byzantine faulty nodes are accused. Of the five syndromes, only the one from node 2 has different 0/1 values fromĥv. Specifically, the syndrome from node 2 differs fromĥv in the first, third, and fifth positions. To record that node 2 has been identified as a faulty node, the health vector is updated by setting the second position to 0.
Finally, each node updates the set of active nodes by executing the following operation:
active nodes ← updateCounter(hv)
Properties
Lemma 1: Node i is diagnosed as faulty in the temporal health vectorĥv in round k + 1 by any obedient node if and only if i suffers a benign fault in round k. Proof: If i suffers no benign fault in round k, then no obedient node sets the ith bit to 0 in its local syndrome in round k + 1. From (1), we have:
Let p be any obedient node (which is possibly i) and let V i denote the ith column of p's diagnosis matrix. Then 
. Therefore i is accused as faulty by p in the Byzantine node accusation.
Lemma 3:
The following two properties hold:
• Correctness: a correct node is never diagnosed as faulty in the health vector of any obedient nodes.
• Completeness: a faulty node that suffers a benign fault in round k or sends an erroneous local syndrome in round k + 1 is always diagnosed as faulty in the health vector of all obedient nodes in round k + 1.
Proof:
The lemma directly follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Problem
The execution time needed to compute the health vector by each node increases at least quadratically with respect to the number of nodes. The performance analysis using our earlier prototype implementation revealed that when the round length was 5ms and the number of nodes was six, the execution time of the membership protocol consumed more than five percent of the whole available CPU time. This ratio might sound small but in practice this is prohibitively large, because CPU time is already a very scarce resource. For automotive systems, it is ideal to assign as much CPU time as possible to controlling applications in order to achieve better driving performance and safety. Thus it is not practically acceptable to spend that much amount of CPU time only for membership service. The earlier system was equipped with 40MHz CPU at each node. Using faster CPUs could mitigate the problem to some extent. However, the demand on high responsiveness of driving control is increasing at the same time. For example, today's automotive controlling systems often require a much shorter round time than the one in our prototype system. Such increasing demand on shorter round time easily offsets the increase of CPU performance.
Voting Sharing
To address the above mentioned problem, we propose voting sharing. The idea of this technique is to have each node perform voting to detect a fault in a single node and to share the voting result with all the nodes. Each node has a responsibility to vote on the exchanged local syndromes with respect to one specific node and to broadcast the result in the following round. As a result, the computation cost required for voting is reduced compared to the existing approach which performs voting for each of the n nodes.
Protocol
The execution of the protocol now involves three rounds, instead of two rounds (Fig. 2) .
In round k, a node locally evaluates other nodes' status, as in the existing approach (EVA phase).
In round k + 1, the local syndrome representing errors observed at round k are broadcast, just as in the existing approach (EXC phase). Unlike in the existing approach, each node p performs voting only for a single node: Node p extracts, from each of the local syndromes received, one element that is associated with a node that p is responsible for. We denote by target(p, k) the node for which p is responsible for diagnosis in the protocol execution that starts from round k. Thus node p collects n − 1 values (excluding target(p, k)'s own evaluation), each of which is either 1, 0, or ε. Then node p performs hybrid voting on these n − 1 values. The result of the voting is either 1 or 0. Following the hybrid voting, node p executes the Byzantine node accusation described in Sect. 3.1 by comparing the voting result with the n − 1 values. Finally, the result of the diagnosis is encoded as an n-bit vector where 0 on the ith bit represents that node i is diagnosed as benign faulty (target(p, k) = i) or Byzantine faulty (target(p, k) i) (VT phase). In round k + 2, the results of the voting and Byzantine node accusation are broadcast (EXC V phase). This phase can be combined with the EXC phase of the next protocol execution by adding the n-bit diagnosis data to the local syndrome. Each node collects diagnosis results from n nodes, including itself. Then, in the DET phase, the node forms a health vector s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n by computing a bitwise AND of all received n-bit diagnosis vectors. Upon obtaining a health vector hv, then the set of active nodes is updated to the return value of function updateCounter(hv). The function updateCounter(hv) is deterministic.
For any round k, target(p, k) must meet the following properties:
The first property states that two different nodes are responsible for voting for two different nodes. This property ensures that in every round, every node has its unique node that is responsible for voting for it. The second property signifies that such a voter node is different from the node diagnosed by that voter node.
Note that in an execution of the proposed protocol that starts from round k, node i is diagnosed twice: in round k +1 and in round k + 2. When necessary, in the latter case we say that a node is diagnosed (as faulty or non-faulty) in the health vector.
Properties
Here, we prove some key properties of voting sharing. Consistency and consistent isolation hold straightforwardly.
Theorem 1: (consistency)
The health vector is agreed by all obedient nodes in each round. Proof: When a node sends its diagnosis result, the message is either received correctly by all nodes, lost due to a benign fault, or received incorrectly by all nodes due to a symmetric Byzantine fault. Hence the health vector finally obtained is identical among all obedient nodes. Theorem 2: (consistent isolation) The set of active nodes is agreed by all obedient nodes in each round. Proof: The counter updating function counterU pdate(hv) is deterministic (see Sect. 4.1). Because of Theorem 1, the health vector hv is identical for all obedient nodes. Hence the active nodes, which are updated to the output of the function in every round, are always identical for all obedient nodes.
Correctness and completeness hold in a somewhat weaker form than the existing method.
Theorem 3: (correctness) Correct node q is never diagnosed as faulty in the health vector in round k +2 if all nodes are obedient. Proof: Suppose that q is a correct node and all nodes are obedient. From Lemmas 1 and 2, q is always diagnosed as correct by any node in round k + 1. In round k + 2 the diagnosis result sent by each node is either correctly broadcast or simply lost, because the node is obedient. Hence q is never diagnosed as faulty in round k + 2 by any nodes in their health vector.
Theorem 4: (completeness w.r.t benign faults) If node q suffers a benign fault in round k, then q is diagnosed as faulty in round k + 2 by all obedient nodes if q's voter node p (i.e., the node such that target(p, k) = q) is obedient and suffers no fault in round k + 2. Proof: From Lemma 1, if node q suffers a benign fault in round k, then q is always diagnosed as faulty by voter node p in round k + 1 if p is obedient. If no fault occurs in the voter node in round k + 2, then the voting result 0 is correctly broadcast and occurs in the health vector of all obedient nodes in the round.
Theorem 5: (completeness w.r.t symmetric Byzantine faults) Suppose that a symmetric Byzantine faulty node q sends an erroneous local syndrome in round k + 1 and that the erroneous syndrome differs from the correct one with respect to evaluation of a node i. Then q is diagnosed as faulty in round k + 2 by all obedient nodes in their health vector if the node p such that target(p, k) = i is obedient and suffers no fault in round k + 2. Proof: By the argument in Lemma 2, if node p such that target(p, k) = i is obedient, then q is always diagnosed as faulty by p in the Byzantine node accusation in round k + 1. If no fault occurs on p in round k + 2, then the diagnosis result is correctly broadcast and reflected in the health vector of all obedient nodes in the round.
These weaker guarantees pose the following problems.
• False negatives: diagnosing faulty nodes as non-faulty.
• False positives: diagnosing correct nodes as faulty.
These problems are mainly caused by Byzantine faulty voters. In the next section, we show how one can address these problems.
Rotating Voters
To mitigate the above problems, we propose the use of rotating voters. The idea is to change the voter node for each node in every round so that a node becomes the voter node for any other node in any consecutive n − 1 rounds. More concretely, node p becomes the voter of node p + 1 in round 1 and then changes the node it is responsible for (i.e., target(p, k)) as p + 2, p + 3, . . . , n, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1. This rotation is repeated every n − 1 rounds. Note that the rotating voter scheme ensures the two conditions on target(p, k) stated in Sect. 4.1.
By means of rotating voters and the algorithm design of the counter updating function counterU pdate(hv), the two problems can be mitigated as follows.
A false negative with respect to node q occurs if all nodes that should be able to diagnose q as faulty happen to be faulty simultaneously in the same round. Rotating voters ensure that any node always becomes a voter for any other node in every consecutive n − 1 rounds. Thus if q suffers faults intermittently or permanently, then it is safely diagnosed as faulty by correct nodes.
The case of false positives is trickier than the other two cases, because a Byzantine voter can repeatedly produce incorrect diagnosis results for any correct nodes. Therefore if the counter updating function simply counted the times when each node is diagnosed as faulty, then it would lead to a rapid and undesirable shrink of the set of active nodes. A possible solution to this is to offset the effects of incorrect diagnosis with those of correct ones. This solution can be implemented by, for example, decreasing the counter if the node is diagnosed as correct. Another approach could be to use two counters for each node that represent penalty and reward, as has been done in the p-r algorithm proposed in [2] .
Experiment Results
This section presents the results of our experiment. We developed a prototype system that was equipped with four to eight nodes. A node was equipped with a 60MHz CPU.
The results are summarized in Table 1 . The row "voting" shows the time required for 1) calculating health vectors (DET phase) in the existing membership, and 2) hybrid voting of the target node (VT phase) and calculating health vectors (DET phase) in the voting sharing. The row "all" shows the total time used for the membership service including the process time to receive and send message frames. Though various processing overheads are added to the pure voting calculation, which is reduced by a factor of the number of nodes, the calculation time for the voting process in the voting sharing is reduced to 42% compared with the existing membership for eight nodes. The total time for the membership service is reduced by 11%, which is substantially effective for industrial embedded systems with extremely limited hardware resources.
Conclusion
To reduce the overhead incurred by fault diagnosis, we proposed voting sharing. We showed the properties ensured by the proposed protocol. Although the proposed protocol has a cost of small degradation of diagnosis accuracy, the overhead can be substantially reduced. A possible future direction is to mitigate the accuracy degradation by, for example, the design of the counter updating algorithm.
